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The Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure: 
Evidence from France, Germany and UK 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We examine the determinants of the debt maturity structure of French, German and British 
firms. These countries represent different financial and legal traditions that may have 
implications on corporate debt maturity structure. Our model incorporates the factors 
representing three major theories (tax considerations, liquidity and signalling, and contracting 
costs) of debt maturity. It also controls for capital market conditions. The results confirm the 
applicability of most theories of debt maturity structure for the UK firms. However, the 
evidence from France and Germany are mixed. Therefore, the findings suggest that the debt 
maturity structure of a firm is determined by firm-specific factors and the country’s financial 
systems and institutional traditions in which it operates. 
 
Keywords: Dynamic Debt Maturity Structure, Panel Data, System-GMM  
 
JEL Classification: G20, G32 
 
 
 
 1 
The Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure: 
Evidence from France, Germany and UK 
 
 
I. Introduction 
In the presence of market imperfections, the need for an appropriate mix of debts stems from 
the golden rule of finance that sources and uses of funds need to be matched inter-temporally 
and cross-sectionally since a mismatch may lead to an inefficient liquidation of a positive-NPV 
firm/project.  An important element of fund matching is the choice between short and long-term 
debts. The existing literature offers three main strands of debt maturity theories. The first is 
based on the tax minimisation objective of firms. Brick and Ravid (1985) suggest that when the 
term-structure of interest rates is upward sloping, long-term debt is optimal since interest tax 
shield from leverage is accelerated1. The second is based on information asymmetries that lead 
to liquidity risk and signalling. Fama (1990) suggests that the debt maturity structure reflects the 
incentive to provide information, monitoring and bonding relevant for contracts. Flannery (1986) 
predicts that high-quality firms prefer short-term debt to signal their quality. The third strand 
deals with contracting costs. Myers (1977) argues that short-term debt mitigates the 
underinvestment problem. Barnea et al. (1980) show that short-term debt may mitigate the 
asset substitution problem since the value of short-term debt is less sensitive to changes in 
firms' asset value. More importantly, however, asymmetric information arguments and 
contracting costs hypothesis jointly suggest that firms match the maturity of their assets and 
liabilities (Hart and Moore, 1994). 
  
In spite of a number of theoretical explanations, empirical studies dedicated to the identification 
of the determinants of debt maturity are relatively new. Earlier studies examine this issue 
indirectly. For instance, Titman and Wessels (1988) report an inverse relation between firm size 
and short-term debt and Mitchell (1993) reports a negative relation between debt maturity and 
leverage and a positive relation between maturity and firm’s quality. Recent studies on the 
determinants of debt maturity structure examine one hypothesis at a time. For instance, Kim et 
al. (1995) report a significant positive association of debt maturity with leverage and firm size.  
Barclay and Smith (1995) show that larger firms with lower market-to-book ratio borrow for 
longer terms. Guedes and Opler (1996) find that larger, better quality and high growth firms 
issue more short-term debts. Stohs and Mauer (1996), however, find mixed evidence of inverse 
relationship between debt maturity and market-to-book ratio. Scherr and Hulburt (2001) find little 
evidence that tax status, growth options, and information asymmetries affect small firms' debt 
                                                          
1 Brick and Ravid (1991) show the optimality of long-term debt even if the yield curve is downward sloping 
or flat when the interest rates are uncertain. However, such patterns of yield curve are rare in markets. 
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maturity choice. On the other hand, capital structure, liquidity risk and the matching of the 
maturities of assets and liabilities are found to be relevant in debt maturity decisions. 
 
The lack of consistency in findings reported in the literature provides a strong motivation for 
further examination of the determinants of debt maturity. The main contribution of this paper is 
the estimation of an integrated model that incorporates several factors representing all major 
theories of the determinants of debt maturity structure. In particular, this approach offers an 
opportunity to test various theories of the determinants of debt maturity (e.g. tax savings, 
immunisation, information asymmetry, contracting costs etc.) and market conditions in a single 
model, and contributes in resolving some of the discrepancies reported in the literature. 
 
The paper makes the following further contributions. First, it offers ‘out of sample’ tests of 
existing theories, primarily originating from the US experience, by providing a comparative 
picture of three major European Markets2. Our sample countries (France, Germany and the UK) 
represent three distinct legal and financial traditions3. Second, we include a new set of variables 
(term-structure of interest rates, stock returns, and equity premium) that captures the effects of 
equity market conditions on corporate debt maturity structure. This creates a link between equity 
and debt markets and sheds light on whether managers combine information from both markets 
while making debt maturity decisions. Third, the estimation method that we use controls for the 
endogeneity that may arise from random shocks affecting both debt maturity and its 
determinants simultaneously. Finally, the speed of the adjustment process in attaining the 
optimal debt maturity structure is examined using a dynamic model.  
 
The findings reveal that there are considerable differences in debt maturity patterns in France, 
Germany and the UK.  Most hypotheses that are identified in the literature hold for British firms 
but not for French and German. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II 
describes the variables and related hypotheses. Section III discusses the data and sample. 
Methodology, models and their robustness tests are discussed in section IV. Section V presents 
the results.  Finally, section VI concludes the paper. 
 
II. Theories, Variables and Hypotheses Development 
This section develops testable propositions and provides justifications for each variable included 
in the analysis in the context of the major theories of corporate debt maturity structure. 
                                                          
2 Recent studies (for instance, Fan et al. (2003)) suggest that cross-country heterogeneity in institutional 
factors might be responsible for the observed diversity in corporate financial decisions around the world. 
3 La Porta et al. (1998) quantifies some measures of institutional differences across the countries. For a 
detailed discussion on the possible implications of financial and institutional traditions on financing 
decisions of companies in France, Germany and the UK see Antoniou et al. (2002).  
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2.1 The Dependent Variable: Measuring Maturity 
There is no universal definition of short- or long-term debt. Following accounting conventions 
some studies (for example, Scherr and Hulburt, 2001) consider a debt as long-term if it is 
payable after a year, while others define it as long-term if it is payable after three (Barclay and 
Smith, 1995) or five years (Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 1997). Similarly, Stohs and Mauer 
(1996) use weighted average maturity of liabilities; Scherr and Hulburt (2001) use two maturity 
specifications, (a) long-term debt payable after one year to total debt ratio, and (b) weighted-
average debt maturity. They, in general, report only a minor sensitivity of the results to the 
choice of definition. Following accounting conventions, we define long-term debt as the debt 
maturing in more than one year and the maturity ratio is defined as long-term debt divided by 
total debt. This choice is also driven by data availability4. 
 
2.2 Explanatory Variables: Reasoning and Measurement 
Four main hypotheses of the determinants of debt maturity structure and the associated 
variables are discussed below. The hypotheses are based on: (a) tax minimisation, (b) liquidity 
risk and signalling, (c) contracting costs, and (d) equity market conditions. These hypotheses 
are not mutually exclusive and a given variable may represent more than one hypothesis with 
the same or opposing effect. Further, due to a number of known limitations and comparability 
problems associated with accounting information, the proxies used can be far from perfect. 
Therefore, where appropriate, more than one variable is used to represent different dimensions 
of a theory. To examine the robustness of the results, where possible, the models are estimated 
using alternative definition of the variables. 
 
2.2.1 Tax minimisation 
The corporate tax rate, the term-structure of interest rates and the uncertainty in the rate of 
interest interact to offer tax incentives in debt maturity structure. Brick and Ravid (1985) argue 
that when the term structure of interest rates is upward sloping, long-term debt is optimal since 
tax gains are accelerated. However, assuming that taxation is the only market imperfection, 
Lewis (1990) argues that taxation has no effect on debt maturity decisions if optimal leverage 
and debt maturity are simultaneously determined. In a multi-period model with uncertain interest 
rate, Kim et al. (1995) demonstrate that a long-term debt maturity strategy maximises investor’s 
tax-timing option value, where the choice is between repurchasing and reissuing the debt. This 
model predicts that a firm lengthens debt maturity as the interest rate volatility and the slope of 
                                                          
4 Some firms consider the recurrent component of short-term debt as long-term debt in their balance 
sheet. Moreover, firms using creative accounting have several possibilities to reduce their reported debt 
and alter their category. Therefore, there are apparent accounting difficulties in measuring long and short-
term debts. We are grateful to the referee for drawing our attention to these limitations. 
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the term structure increases5. Kane et al. (1985) argue that optimal maturity is negatively 
associated with tax advantage of debt and the volatility of firm value and positively correlated 
with flotation costs. Hence, tax rates and debt maturity should be inversely related to ensure 
that the tax benefits of debt are not less than the amortised flotation costs. 
 
Scholes and Wolfson (1992) propose a tax clientele argument to predict the relationship 
between debt maturity and taxation. They argue that not all firms can afford to issue ‘expensive’ 
long-term debt, although the transaction costs of rolling-over short-term debt are higher. Thus, 
corporations with high marginal tax rates represent a natural clientele of ‘cheap’ long-term debt 
as they can use the ongoing tax advantages of long-term debt. 
 
Thus, the tax hypothesis is represented by three factors: (a) the effective tax rate, (b) the term 
structure of interest rate, and (c) the volatility in interest rate. We measure the effective tax rate 
by the ratio of tax paid to taxable income. The term structure of interest rates is the difference 
between the month-end yields on long-term (10 years or more) government bonds and three-
months treasury-bills, matched to the month of the firm’s fiscal year-end (a six-month lag is used 
to allow for the time gap between decision making and actual issue of debt). Interest rates 
volatility is the standard deviation of the monthly government bond yield over the previous year, 
matched with the month of firm’s fiscal year-end. 
 
2.2.2 Liquidity Risk and Signalling  
This hypothesis suggests that the capital structure, liquidity and volatility of earnings and firm 
value interact to influence the debt maturity decisions of managers and the managers are 
motivated in reducing the bankruptcy risk. 
 
Leverage: Leland and Toft (1996) show firms opting for higher leverage also choose longer 
maturity. Morris (1992) suggests that firms with higher debt tend to issue longer-term debt in 
order to delay their exposure to bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, Dennis et al. (2000) argue 
that leverage and maturity should be inversely related as the agency costs of underinvestment 
can be mitigated by reducing leverage as well as by shortening debt maturity. Therefore, the 
nature of relation between leverage and debt maturity remains an empirical question. To 
examine the robustness of estimates we measure leverage in three ways. They are: (a) the ratio 
of book value of total debt to book value of total assets, (b) the ratio of book value of total debt 
to market value of equity plus book value of total debt, and (c) the ratio of total debt less cash 
and equivalent to total assets.   
                                                          
5 On the contrary, Stohs and Mauer (1996) find a negative association between the slope of the yield 
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Liquidity: Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that a high liquidity ratio may reduce the fund raising 
capacity of firms, as excessive liquidity reduces the managers' ability to commit credibly to an 
investment action. Non-depreciating assets (e.g. land) are linked to increased debt maturity. 
However, non-depreciating but liquid assets (e.g. inventories) do not support long-term debt. In 
buying long-term bonds, lenders are exposed to the risk that the firm's conditions may 
deteriorate over time or the management may shift to riskier projects before the bonds mature. 
Thus, lenders may impose restrictions on long-term borrowing to control for such risks and 
hence the firms with higher liquidity will be able to raise long-term debt. To examine the 
robustness of estimation we measure the liquidity in two ways: (a) the ratio of current assets to 
total assets, and (b) the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (working capital ratio). 
 
Firm level volatility: Kane et al. (1985) and Sarkar (1999) showed that the debt maturity is 
inversely related to the volatility of firm’s value. Low variability in firm value inspires the 
managers to avoid rebalancing their capital structure frequently. Aiming at avoiding the potential 
risk of bankruptcy, such firms issue long-term debt rather than short-term debt. The firm level 
volatility is measured by volatility in earnings6. It is estimated as the absolute value of change in 
earnings (EBITD) minus average earnings change.   
 
Firm’s quality: The signalling hypothesis implies that firms with high asymmetric information 
problems and high-quality projects choose to issue shorter-term debt (Mitchell, 1991). Under 
asymmetric information, Flannery (1986) argues that long-term debt, which is more sensitive to 
firm value, can potentially be more mis-priced than short-term debt. Hence, high (low) quality 
firms are likely to issue less (more) undervalued (overvalued) short (long) -term debt. He also 
shows that low-quality firms cannot afford to rollover short-term debt due to positive transaction 
costs, and thus opt for long-term debt. Confirming the theoretical prediction of Flannery (1986), 
Datta and Iskandar-Datta (2000) empirically find a negative relation between long-run abnormal 
returns and the maturity of debt-IPOs. For the same reason, we expect a negative relationship 
between firm quality and debt maturity. To examine the robustness of our results we measure 
firm quality in two ways: (a) the ratio of net income plus depreciation to net debt, and (b) the 
ratio of shareholders funds to net debt. 
 
In summary, liquidity risk and signalling hypothesis are represented by four factors - leverage, 
liquidity, firm level volatility, and firm’s quality – in our model.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
curve and debt maturity due to the attempts of firms to avoid term premium in long-term interest rates.  
6 In the absence of reliable cash-flow data, empirical studies measure volatility of firm value by volatility in 
earnings (see, for instance, Stohs and Mauer, 1996). 
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2.2.3 Contracting Cost 
This hypothesis suggests that short-term debts offer better monitoring opportunities for lenders 
as the managers need to approach lenders more frequently to renew short-term debts. 
Therefore, firms requiring close/frequent monitoring are forced to opt for short-term debts. 
 
Growth opportunities: Myers (1977) suggests that agency related underinvestment problems are 
mitigated if growth firms use short-term debts that expire before exercising the growth options, 
thereby borrowers and lenders can renegotiate. Similarly, the agency cost of monitoring may be 
reduced if firms are evaluated periodically by issuing short-term debts. Titman (1992) argues 
that if growth firms have both greater likelihood of bankruptcy and optimistic future-outlook, they 
can benefit from borrowing for short-term. Thus, growth opportunity should be inversely related 
to debt maturity. However, the liquidity risk argument (Diamond, 1991) predicts that firms with 
long-term investment opportunities - requiring ongoing managerial discretion - prefer to hedge 
against liquidity risk by issuing long-term debts. Hart and Moore (1995) emphasise the role of 
long-term debt in controlling management's ability to raise funds for future projects. Long-term 
debts may prevent self-interested managers from financing unprofitable investment. This implies 
a direct relationship between long-term debt and growth opportunity. Therefore, the nature of 
the relationship between growth opportunity and debt maturity is an empirical issue. We 
measure growth opportunities by market-to-book ratio7. 
 
Firm size: Arguably, larger firms have lower asymmetric information, higher tangible assets 
relative to future investment opportunities, and thus easier access to long-term debt markets. 
Agency problems between shareholders and lenders, such as risk shifting and claim dilution, 
may be particularly severe for small firms. Therefore, bondholders attempt to control the risk of 
lending to small firms by restricting the length of debt maturity. Thus, a positive relationship 
between firm size and debt maturity is expected. Firm size is measured in two ways: (a) the 
natural logarithm of total sales, and (b) the natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
Asset maturity structure: The immunisation hypothesis suggests that firms match their debt 
maturity to their asset maturity. This principle has been widely accepted, as it controls for the 
risk and costs of financial distress. Hart and Moore (1994) confirm the matching principle by 
showing that slower asset depreciation means longer debt maturity. In a survey of 392 US firms, 
Graham and Harvey (2001) find that matching maturity between liabilities and assets is 
                                                          
7 Data on alternative proxies of growth (e.g. R&D plus advertising expenses to total assets ratio) are not 
available. 
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important in choosing whether to issue short or long-term debt. Therefore, we expect a positive 
relationship between debt maturity and asset maturity. We measure asset maturity by the ratio 
of net property, plant and equipment to depreciation. 
 
Thus, the contracting (agency) cost hypothesis is represented by three variables, namely growth 
opportunities, firm size and asset maturity structure.  
 
2.2.4 Equity Market Conditions 
Most prior studies on debt maturity structure do not provide sufficient evidence relating to the 
influence of equity market conditions. However, since managers are expected to maximize the 
value of the firm through their decisions, they are unlikely to ignore the equity market conditions 
when deciding debt maturity.  
 
Share price performance: The signalling hypothesis argues that undervalued firms issue short-
term debt to signal their undervaluation (Myers, 1984). Furthermore, Guedes and Opler (1996) 
state that past stock returns may be used as predictors of debt maturity, as it is generally 
expected that the issuing of informationally disadvantaged securities, such as long-term debt, 
would follow share price run-ups. We, thus, expect a positive correlation between debt maturity 
and past share price performance.  
 
Equity risk premium: The equity premium measures the cost of equity in relation to the return on 
a risk-free investment. Baker and Wurgler (2000) find that firms tend to issue equity instead of 
debt when the future cost of equity is relatively low. It is also argued that expected bond returns 
are relatively low when business conditions are good. This is due to higher equity returns (and 
premium) reflecting profitable investment opportunities. This inspires the value enhancing 
managers to raise debt (long-term), instead of equity, when the equity premium is high.  
 
In summary, the above two factors represent equity market conditions, which may impact on 
debt maturity decision. The share price performance is measured by the first difference of log of 
annual prices and the equity premium is measured by the difference between the return on 
equity and the return on treasury-bills, matched to the month of the firm's fiscal year-end. To 
allow for a time gap between the decision making process and the issuance of debt, both 
variables are used with six month lags. 
 
2.3 Debt Maturity Dynamics: Lagged Maturity 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, debt maturity, on the right-hand side of the 
equation allows for the testing of the existence of a target optimal debt maturity structure and, if 
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it exists, of the degree of divergence (convergence) from (to) the target level. Jalilvand and 
Harris (1984) find that firms partially adjust to their long-run financial targets. Tax, bankruptcy, 
and monitoring cost-related arguments predict a positive impact of lagged maturity, but the 
signalling hypothesis implies that this factor has no effect on debt maturity (Mitchell, 1993). A 
significant, positive and less than unit coefficient of lagged debt maturity variable would suggest 
that the firms have a target optimal debt maturity structure. A greater than one coefficient would 
imply that firms do not have any target ratio.  
 
Although in the above paragraphs several variables are grouped according to their principal 
predictions, some of the variables reveal information on the validity of more than one 
hypothesis. Table 1 summarises the empirical predictions of each of the determinants of debt 
maturity structure discussed in this section. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
III. The Sample 
The sample includes all non-financial firms traded (including delisted) in the stock exchanges of 
three major European countries (France, Germany and the UK) during the sample period. The 
sample period is guided by the availability of data. It starts from 1969, 1983 and 1987 for the 
UK, France and Germany respectively, and ends in 2000. To allow for the dynamic modelling, 
we exclude the firms with less than three consecutive observations (see Appendix A for further 
details). Data are obtained from Datastream.  
 
Table 2 shows that the average long-term debt ratio is highest in France (59%) and lowest in 
the UK (46%), while its standard deviation is highest in the UK and lowest in France. The high 
dispersion reflects relatively wider cross-sectional as well as time series variation in the debt 
maturity structure of British firms. On average, the effective rate of tax is highest in Germany 
(39%) followed by the UK (36%). The asset maturity ratio is highest in the UK (13.6) and lowest 
in France (5.9). Such cross-country differences in other variables (see table 2 for other 
variables) imply substantial variations in the tradition and practices of corporate financial 
systems in these sample countries.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
It is also possible that the financial markets have gone through major structural change during 
the sample period and the average relation obtained by pooling the data for such a long period 
may not reflect the true picture. To allow for this possibility we split the sample into two sub-
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sample periods. The market for short-term securities in France was opened in 1985 and 
expanded substantially in 1992 with the introduction of medium-term notes. This change offered 
opportunities to issue a range of fixed income securities that mature in a very short period to 
long period (Banque de France publications, 2002). This brought a major change in the 
structure of the corporate debt market in France. Therefore, we divide the French sample into 
two sub periods viz., 1983-1992 and 1993-2000. This change has resulted in a decline in the 
average proportion of long-term loan to total debt from 63% during 1983-1992 to 57% during 
1993-2000. In Germany until 1992 public issue of commercial papers and longer-term bonds 
were discouraged through the requirements of the issue authorisation procedure and the 
securities transfer tax. Since 1991, innovations in financial and legal traditions have affected the 
German financial markets considerably. Thus, we divide the German sample into two sub-
samples covering 1987-1992 and 1993-2000. Following this change, the proportion of long-term 
debt on total corporate debt of Germany has declined from 57% to 50% reflecting the ease at 
which firms can raise short-term debt by issuing commercial papers. The major change in 
British capital markets occurred in 1986. The Financial Services Act 1986 was introduced and 
the operation mechanisms of stock market were altered (known as Big Bang) in October 1986. 
Increasing transparency and reducing trading costs were some of the major motives of this 
change. Therefore, we split the UK sample into two sub-samples covering 1969-1986 and 1987-
2000. Unlike in France and Germany the proportion of long-term debt on total debt has 
increased recently in the UK. This could be due to the ease and lower cost of issuing long-term 
securities following the change of 1986 and declining interest cost. Overall, these artefacts 
confirm that the changes in regulations do affect the debt maturity structure of corporate entities. 
 
Correlation analysis (table 3) shows significant positive relation between maturity and leverage 
in all countries. The firm’s quality has no substantive correlation with the debt maturity in any of 
the countries in the sample. The observed positive association of debt maturity with firm size in 
France and in the UK, and with asset maturity in all countries is supported by the theory. The 
effective tax rate is positively correlated only in Germany. However, market-to-book ratio is 
significantly inversely correlated with debt maturity in France and Germany. Stohs and Mauer 
(1996) suggest that if the leverage is strongly positively correlated to debt maturity and is 
strongly negatively correlated to market-to-book ratio, we should control for the effect of 
leverage in the model to prevent the downward bias in estimated coefficient of market-to-book 
ratio. The estimates in this paper show that this is the case for all countries. 
 
Table 3 about here 
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IV. The Methodology 
This section provides a discussion on the appropriateness of alternative methods of estimation, 
such as OLS, instrumental variables, traditional difference-GMM, as well as recently developed 
system-GMM methods. Each method is applied in testing the determinants of debt maturity and 
the validity of all methods of estimation examined. In the extant literature, the endogeneity 
problem is either largely ignored, or only corrected using fixed effects or control variables. This 
study controls for this crucial problem and avoids significant bias in estimates by employing a 
more advanced method of GMM.  
 
4.1 The model 
Our model of corporate debt maturity structure represents three major theories and market 
conditions. We examine these theories in a panel data framework. The main motivation for using 
panel data is to control for unobservable firm heterogeneity. Dennis et al (2000) criticise previous 
studies on the use of the exogeneity assumption that causes bias in estimates. This study 
controls for this problem. Furthermore, most previous studies on the determinants of corporate 
debt maturity use period average cross sectional data rather than panel data. The advantages of 
panel data include increased degrees of freedom owing to the availability of large number of 
observations, and reduced collinearity among explanatory variables leading to efficient 
estimates. A partial adjustment model is adopted to investigate the presence of target debt 
maturity structure. To achieve a complete dynamic specification, allowing for a possible AR-
process, and to examine the adjustment cost effect, the lagged dependent variable and lagged 
explanatory variables are incorporated in the model as in equation (1): 
 
it
k k
titki
b
kkit
a
ktiit XXYY    
 

1 1
)1()1(10)(    (1) 
 
The dependent variable, Yit, is a measure of the debt maturity of firm i in year t.  Xa and Xb are 
vectors of current and lagged explanatory variables respectively. vi represents time-invariant 
unobservable firm-specific effects, such as reputation and capital intensity; and vt represents 
time-specific effects (e.g. interest rates and demand shocks) which are common to all firms and 
can change overtime. β0, β1, γs and δs are unknown parameters to estimate.  The time-varying 
disturbance term εit is serially uncorrelated with mean zero and variance σ2. The explanatory 
variables (k=1 to12) are: (1) Effective tax rate, (2) Term structure of interest rates, (3) Interest 
rate volatility, (4) Leverage, (5) Liquidity, (6) Firm level volatility, (7) Firm quality, (8) Growth 
opportunity, (9) Firm size, (10) Asset maturity, (11) Share price performance, and (12) Market 
equity premium. See section II for their definition and measurement. 
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4.2 The methods of estimation 
Estimating equation (1) using an OLS technique would not produce unbiased coefficients 
because vi is unobservable and correlated with other regressors in the model (Hsiao (1985)). 
Since some lagged dependent variables may be correlated with firm-specific effects, the 
estimates may be inconsistent. Although it is possible to eliminate vi by first-differencing, the 
OLS estimators are still inefficient, since it and Yi(t-1) are correlated as a consequence of the 
correlation between i(t-1) and Yi(t-1). In addition, OLS assumes that all the explanatory variables 
are strictly exogenous which may not the case in debt maturity decisions. 
 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose an instrumental variables (IV) technique to overcome the 
above problems. They suggested that Yi(t-2), or Yi(t-2), can be used as instrument for Yi(t-1). This 
instrument selection is relevant and valid because Yi(t-2), or Yi(t-2), is correlated with Yi(t-1), but 
not with it. If it is not serially correlated then the IV estimates will be consistent. However, 
since the IV technique neither uses all the related moment conditions, nor accounts for the 
differenced structure of the error term, the estimates are unlikely to be efficient. 
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest that GMM controls for these problems. GMM employs 
additional instruments obtained by utilising the orthogonal conditions that exist between the 
error term (it) and the lagged dependent variable. Therefore, GMM optimally exploits all the 
linear moment restrictions specified by the model, the main advantage of the GMM technique. It 
is argued that E(it,it-1) in equation (1) is not necessarily zero, but E(it,it-2) should be zero as 
the consistency of GMM estimators is based on the absence of second-order correlation in 
differences and of first-order correlation in levels. If we assume that the error terms are not 
correlated, it is expected that it is orthogonal to the history of the variables X and Y so that (Xit-
2, Xit-3,…Yit-2,  Yit-3,…) can be used as valid instruments for it. If it follows an MA(1) process, then 
the instrument set will include the following Xit-3, Xit-4, …, Yit-3, Yit-4,…. That is, the first valid 
instruments starts from the third lag, not from the second, because the differenced-disturbances 
follow an MA(2) process. Consequently, it is essential that there is no higher-order serial 
correlation to have a valid set of instruments independent from the residuals. One can 
investigate this by the use of Sargan test of over identifying restrictions. 
 
We apply the two-step GMM estimators that use one-step residuals to construct the 
asymptotically optimal weighting matrix. This is more efficient than the one-step estimators 
when the disturbances are expected to show heteroscedasticity in the large sample data with a 
relatively long time span. This can control the correlation of errors overtime, heteroscedasticity 
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across firms, simultaneity and measurement errors due to the utilisation of the orthogonality 
conditions on the variance-covariance matrix. 
 
The discussion above reveals that the GMM specification of the first differences (GMM-DIF) is 
superior to many other methods. However, recent research shows that the GMM-DIF estimator 
has a problem related to weak instruments. It is known that first-differencing causes information 
loss across cross-section units (firms, in our case) and exacerbates measurement error biases. 
Arellano and Bover (1995) argue that the absence of information with respect to the parameters 
in the level variables causes substantial loss of efficiency in models estimated in first-differences 
using instruments in levels. They propose the use of instruments in first differences for 
equations in levels and instruments in levels for equations in first differences. Blundell and Bond 
(1998) show that this system-GMM (GMM-SYS) estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) has 
dramatic efficiency gains in cases where GMM-DIF estimator performs poorly especially for 
short sample period and persistent data8. This poor performance is particularly apparent when 
the coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent variable approaches unity and the ratio of 
[variance(vi)/variance(εit)] increases (see equation (1)). In such cases, the coefficient of lagged 
dependent variable is downward-biased. Moreover, Blundell and Bond (1998) report that once 
lagged first-differenced and lagged-levels instruments are incorporated into the instrument set, 
the finite sample bias can be reduced considerably by exploiting the additional moment 
conditions coming from level equations. They show that the instruments used by the GMM-DIF 
estimator contain little information about the endogenous variables in first differences, and 
lagged first differences are informative instruments for the endogenous variables in levels. In 
this way, apart from controlling for individual heterogeneity, one could partially capture 
variations between firms’ characteristics. Thus, GMM-SYS seems to be the most appropriate 
method to estimate equation (1). However, the validity of the arguments for and against 
alternative methods of estimation is tested on the data set before discussing the economics of 
determinants of debt maturity structure in sample countries.  
 
4.3 Target maturity structure and speed of adjustment 
Static panel data models implicitly assume that firms are able to adjust their financing structure 
without any delay. However, we allow for any possible delay in adjusting the target maturity 
structure that may occur due to the presence of adjustment costs. This is investigated through 
adopting a partial adjustment process. Assume that the desired target maturity structure 
( *itMaturity ) is a function of k explanatory variables as in equation (2): 
                                                          
8 Under the extended GMM-SYS technique, the model is estimated in both levels and first differences; 
that is, in stacked regressions level equations are simultaneously estimated using differenced lagged 
regressors as instruments. 
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
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k
itkitkit xMaturity                                                                       (2) 
x is a vector of k explanatory variables; ωit is a serially correlated disturbance term with mean 
zero and possibly heteroscedastic; and ψk's are unknown parameters to estimate. The model 
assumes that firms adjust their current maturity structure (Maturityi,t) according to the degree of 
adjustment coefficient "", to obtain the target maturity structure: 
)( 1
*
1   itititit MaturityMaturityMaturityMaturity                                          (3) 
If  =1, then the actual change will be equal to the desired change. If  = 0, however, no 
adjustments are made, implying that either the lagged level is the target level, or the cost of 
adjustment is higher than the cost of remaining off target. By combining equations (2) and (3) 
we obtain equation (4): 
t
k
kitkitit xMaturityMaturity   


1
1)1(           (4) 
Equation (4) assumes that  lies between zero and unity. If the cost of being in disequilibrium is 
higher (lower) than the cost of adjustment then  tends to unity (zero). 
 
4.4 Long-term relation 
The long-term relationship between corporate debt maturity and its determinants may differ from 
the short-term effects. Any difference in the sign of the coefficient of the contemporaneous and 
lagged values of the explanatory variables reveals this possibility (Blundell and Bond, 1998). We 
examine the long-run relationship by estimating equation (5).  
 
The parameters used in equation (5) (β, γ and δ) are obtained from a dynamic estimation of 
equation (1). Since it is not easy to establish exogeneity in financial and accounting data, the 
direction of causation between variables could be problematic because of endogeneity. If, for 
instance, there has been a change in the market value of a firm in this year compared to last 
year, the source of this change should be obtained from last year’s financial decisions. 
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Therefore, using the contemporaneous data for both the maturity and the determinants may 
lead to spurious results. Our model does not suffer from this problem. 
 
V. The Results 
In order to examine whether the theoretical arguments about the various methods of estimation 
discussed above hold for our data set, equation (1) was estimated using OLS, Anderson-Hsiao 
type method, and GMM in levels and first differences. The results and diagnostics from these 
methods were then compared to those from the GMM-SYS method. The estimates confirmed 
the discussion in the method section and suggested that GMM-SYS is the most appropriate 
estimation technique. 
 
The weak instruments problem discussed earlier in relation to GMM-DIF is apparent from a 
comparison of GMM-DIF results with fixed-effects estimates (WITHIN) in table 4. The results in 
this table are generally similar and the estimated coefficient of lagged maturity of GMM-DIF is 
not substantially higher than that of WITHIN. Hence, it confirms the downward bias in the 
lagged-maturity coefficient, showing the existence of a weak instruments problem. The 
arguments presented in the previous section, together with the findings in table 4, suggest that 
the most appropriate method to test dynamic debt maturity structure is the two-step GMM-SYS9. 
Our results are robust for many reasons. First, the potential endogeneity problem is eliminated 
by the GMM methodology. Second, the GMM process does not need the conditions of 'no 
autocorrelation', 'no heteroscedasticity', and 'normality' to be fulfilled especially for large 
samples. Third, our panel data set does not suffer from small sample bias, and asymptotic 
standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
In order to examine whether the determinants of debt maturity are country specific, the data for 
all sample countries were pooled together and equation (1) estimated with dummies for the UK 
and Germany. A significant coefficient of the country dummy in the model would imply the 
presence of country specific factors in determining the debt maturity structure. Table 5 
documents the GMM-SYS estimation results for this estimation. The dummy variable for the UK 
is significant at 1% implying that country-specific factors are important in corporate debt maturity 
decisions. This necessitates the estimation of the model for each individual country. 
 
Table 5 about here 
                                                          
9 Estimates of equation (1) in static form support the use of a dynamic GMM model. 
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5.1 Target Debt Maturity and Speed of Adjustment 
The positive, statistically significant and less than unit coefficients for the lagged maturity 
variable (table 6) suggest the presence of costly and non-instantaneous adjustments towards 
target maturity structure in all three countries10. This is consistent with the findings of Newberry 
and Novack (1999). The coefficient of lagged maturity (1-ρ) suggests that the French firms have 
the highest adjustment speed. On the contrary, the adjustment process is relatively costly and 
slow in the UK. This implies that the cost of being off-target is not significantly higher than the 
cost of adjustment for British firms. The adjustment speed of German firms lies between the 
French and British cases. This trend holds for both sub-samples as well11. An analysis of sub-
sample reveals that the speed of adjustment has increased in the recent years in France and 
the UK but declined in Germany. Overall, the results support the dynamic debt maturity 
structure decision as the firms in our sample countries seem to trade-off between adjustment 
costs and the costs of being off-target.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
5.2 Tax Minimisation 
Effective tax rate: The relation between the effective tax rate and debt maturity is country 
dependent (table 7). In line with the findings of Dennis et al. (2000), the tax rate’s coefficient is 
insignificant for France and the UK. The significantly positive coefficient for Germany is 
consistent with the findings of Newberry and Novack (1999) supporting the tax clientele 
argument that firms with high marginal tax rates and with better ability to use interest tax shields 
issue long-term debt. This may be caused by the relatively higher rate of tax in Germany12. The 
insignificant coefficient of the UK firms could be attributed to the tax rule that allows firms to 
prepare separate accounts for tax computation and for public consumption. Moreover, the 
provisions of allowing firms to prepare group accounts and carry forward losses make it difficult 
to detect the actual influence of the effective tax rate on debt maturity. In the case of France, it 
is known that potential tax benefits are prone to diminish due to declining tax rates. Moreover, 
the effective tax rate in France is lower than in the UK and Germany (table 2). This reduces the 
importance of tax considerations in the debt maturity decision. Overall, in recent years the 
effective rate of tax has not played any significant role in determining the debt maturity structure 
of the firms in sample countries. 
                                                          
10 The 'specific' estimates in table 6 are obtained following the general-to-specific approach, i.e. by 
excluding the insignificant lagged explanatory variables from the estimation of a general dynamic model. 
11 The estimates of sub-samples are not reported to conserve space. 
12 The positive and significant coefficient is limited to the period prior to 1992. 
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Interest rates and volatility: Estimates (table 7) show positive and significant effects of term 
structure of interest rates in Germany and the UK. This lends support to the tax hypothesis that 
long-term debt accelerates tax gains when the term-structure is upward sloping. However, its 
effect on debt maturity structure of French firms is negative13. The importance of term structure 
is sample period dependent as well. In the UK, its role is not significant in recent years. This 
could be due to low rate of interest in the recent years that is gradually declining since late 
1980s. Table 7 further shows that effect of interest rate volatility on debt maturity structure is 
also country dependent. Its role is insignificant in France and Germany. However, its effect is 
negative and significant in the UK implying that British firms avoid entering into long-term 
commitments while the degree of uncertainty is high14.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that the relationship between debt maturity and tax considerations 
(effective tax rate, the term structure of interests and the interest rate volatility) is rather weak 
and depends on sample period and country analysed. 
 
Table 7 about here 
5.3 Liquidity Risk and Signalling 
Leverage: The estimates (table 7) reveal a significant and positive association between book 
leverage ratio and debt maturity in all countries15. This supports the view that firms with higher 
debt-ratios attempt to control for bankruptcy risk and the costs of financial distress by 
lengthening their debt maturity. However, this finding rejects the monitoring hypothesis that 
shorter maturity decreases agency costs by accelerating the frequency of creditors’ audit. A 
sub-sample analysis shows that the effect of leverage on debt maturity is period dependent, 
being more prominent in the recent years. 
 
Liquidity: The association between debt maturity and liquidity is negative and significant in all 
sample countries (table 7). A similar relation is observed in both sub-sample periods except in 
the case of France where it is significant only in recent period. The observed inverse relation 
suggests that the firms with high liquidity are unable to raise long-term debt. This is possibly due 
to agency cost associated with free cash flow. Moreover, the liquid assets do not support for 
long-term borrowings as the lenders are exposed to the risk that the management may shift to 
riskier projects or the firm’s conditions deteriorate over time.   
 
                                                          
13 Newberry and Novack (1999) and Dennis et al. (2000) report a positive relationship while Barclay and 
Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996) report a negative relation.  
14 When the sample is divided into two sub-periods, the significance of this variable disappears. 
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Earnings volatility: The estimates (table 7) show that the effect of earnings volatility on debt 
maturity is country dependent with no significant influence on the debt maturity decisions of 
German firms, positive on French firms and negative on British firms. The positive relation 
between the debt maturity and earnings volatility of French firms implies that French firms with 
volatile earnings issue long-term debt to avoid possible liquidation. On the other hand, British 
firms with high volatile earnings raise less long-term debt, possibly to avoid any long-term 
commitment. 
 
Firm’s quality: The signalling hypothesis predicts a negative relation between firm’s quality and 
debt maturity. However, like Dennis et al. (2000), we find no support for this hypothesis in any of 
the sample countries, except during the first sub-sample period in France. There are several 
possible explanations for the observed insignificant relation. First, short-term debt may cause 
inefficient liquidation and, thus, high quality firms prefer a combination of short- and long-term 
debt (Diamond, 1993). Second, a non-monotonic relationship between debt maturity and firm 
quality may exist, that is only medium-rated firms issue long-term debt, and very low-rated and 
high-rated firms choose short-term debt (Diamond, 1991)16. Finally, in code-law countries where 
the relationship between major stakeholders and managers is closer, potential problems of 
asymmetric information are likely to be less severe than in common-law countries (Ball et al., 
2000). The insignificant relation in Germany and France may partly be explained by this 
argument. 
 
Overall, the results lend mixed support for the liquidity risk and signalling hypotheses. Firms in 
all countries seem to take the potential threat of bankruptcy seriously while setting their debt 
maturity structure. The relevance of these hypotheses to firms is found to be country dependent. 
 
5.4 Contracting Costs 
Market-to-book ratio: The estimates (table 7) reveal that the market-to-book ratio (a proxy for 
growth opportunities) has no significant effect on debt maturity of firms operating in any of the 
sample countries (except some evidence of support in Germany prior to 1992). This refutes the 
predictions of the contracting cost hypothesis. The insignificant association implies that sub-
optimal investment concerns are not important. This may be due to Chan-Lau's (2001) 
argument that the advantages of a specific corporate governance system are not necessarily 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 Estimates based on alternative measures of leverage are qualitatively similar. 
16 The prediction of an inverted-U shape relation between firm’s quality and debt maturity has strong 
empirical support in Stohs and Mauer (1996). To test for this, we used a squared-quality variable (if 
quality<0 it is multiplied by -1 to retain the original sign). It is expected that maturity should be positively 
correlated with quality and negatively correlated with squared-quality, such that maturity increases as 
firm’s quality deteriorates at a decreasing rate. The coefficients were statistically insignificant in all cases.  
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related to informational asymmetries; apart from mitigating the shareholders-managers conflicts, 
bank-oriented systems may also curtail the under-investment problem.  
 
Firm Size: Table 7 shows that firm size has a significant and positive impact only on British 
firms' debt maturity decision17. This holds for sub-samples as well. The insignificant effect is in 
line with the conventional wisdom that indirect bankruptcy costs, implicit in firm size, are less in 
Germanic and Latinic economies than in Anglo-Saxon economies, due to the corporate 
ownership structure and the long-run relationship between firms and their external financiers. 
This argument is further supported by the significant and positive effect of this variable in the 
UK. These findings confirm the arguments related to affordable transaction costs, easy access 
to capital markets, lower informational asymmetries, reputational considerations, and weak 
incentive problems, which are all relevant factors when larger firms issue long-term debt. 
 
Asset maturity structure: Consistent with most empirical studies referred to earlier we find a 
significant and positive relationship between asset maturity and debt maturity of French and 
German firms for the full sample period (table 7). This supports the view that firms match the 
maturities of assets and liabilities (the immunisation hypothesis). However, asset maturity 
appears to have no significant impact on the debt maturity decisions of British firms. The 
combination of the insignificant coefficients of both market-to-book ratio and asset maturity 
supports the life cycle theory of firms. It also implies an absence of an under-investment 
problem in the UK.  
 
Thus, the contracting cost hypothesis receives mixed support.  
 
5.5 Equity Market Conditions 
Share price performance: The association of debt maturity with share price performance varies 
across countries (table 7). In France, changes in stock prices do not have any significant effect 
on debt maturity decision of firms. However, this relationship is positive and significant for full 
sample in Germany and for full sample and second sub-sample in the UK. The positive relation 
confirms the predictions of the asymmetric information models (Lucas and McDonald, 1990) that 
firms issue informationally disadvantaged securities (e.g. long-term debt) after the rise in their 
share prices. 
 
Equity risk premium: Table 7 further shows that the association of debt maturity with equity 
premium also depends on country and sample period. It is positive and significant in Germany 
                                                          
17 Size measured by total assets did not alter the quality of results. 
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and the UK, but insignificant in France. This suggests that firms in France take debt maturity 
decisions without considering the equity market conditions. On the contrary, British and German 
firms issue long-term debt if the equity premium is high, reflecting managers' attempt to 
minimise the cost of capital by making a choice between the sources of funding. Unsurprisingly, 
this finding is stronger in the case of a market oriented economy, the UK.  
 
In summary, the results show that most of the factors identified in the literature as determinants 
of corporate debt maturity structure are found significant in the case of British firms, but not for 
German and French firms. The overall explanatory power of the model (the coefficient of 
determination) is relatively higher for the UK. Thus, the results clearly support the view that 
corporate financial decisions are not only dependent on company specific factors, but they are 
also guided by the financial, legal and corporate governance traditions of the country in which 
the firms operate. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The paper identifies the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure in three major 
European countries (France, Germany and the UK) using a dynamic system-GMM. The three 
main strands of debt maturity theories that we test simultaneously are (a) the tax minimisation 
theory (b) the information asymmetry (liquidity and signalling) theory and (c) the contracting 
costs theory. We allow for dynamism in debt maturity structure and control for possible 
implications of market factors by incorporating a bridge between equity and debt markets. 
Several conclusions emerge. First, firms in all three countries appear to adjust their debt 
maturity structure towards their target level. The French firms are swifter than their British and 
German counterparts. The speed of adjustment has increased in recent years in France and the 
UK, possibly due to improved capital markets. 
 
Second, the tax minimisation hypothesis – that predicts when the term-structure of interest rates 
is upward sloping, long-term debt is optimal - receives some support in all countries. The 
effective tax rate has a significant and positive influence on the length of debt maturity in 
Germany. The term-structure of interest rates influences the debt maturity choice of firms in all 
three countries, and the volatility in the rate of interest affects the debt maturity choice of UK 
firms. Further, the evidence from Germany supports the tax clientele argument that high 
marginal tax rates encourage firms to borrow for longer-term.  
 
Third, the liquidity risk hypothesis (information asymmetry theory) also receives some support. 
Confirming the managerial objective of reducing bankruptcy risk, a significant and positive effect 
of leverage on debt maturity is found in all countries. Similarly, liquidity plays an important role 
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on debt maturity decisions of the firms operating in all countries reflecting the need to avoid 
costly and lengthy bankruptcy process. Further, the firm level volatility has a significant impact 
on French and British firms reflecting the importance of risk. However, the debt maturity 
structure of firms remains independent of firm quality in all countries. Overall, the liquidity risk 
hypothesis of debt maturity receives mixed support.  
 
Fourth, all factors representing the contracting (agency) cost hypothesis affect the debt maturity 
decisions of the UK firms. However, these factors have no significant effect in France and 
Germany. Finally, the evidence further supports that UK firms consider equity market conditions 
when deciding their debt maturity structure while the German and French don’t. A prediction of 
the signalling hypothesis that firms issue long-term debt after an increase in their share price 
holds in Germany and the UK. Thus, the influence of equity market conditions on corporate debt 
maturity structure is country dependent. 
 
In summary, corporate objectives such as minimising tax, bankruptcy risk and agency costs 
exert some influence on the debt maturity structure of firms in all three countries. Moreover, we 
identify some market related factors that have substantial impact on the debt maturity structure 
of firms, especially in a market based economy like the UK. However, the nature and the 
magnitude of the effects of these factors are country dependent reflecting the influences of the 
financial environment, regulations, and corporate governance traditions of the country in which 
the firm operates.  
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Table 1 
The relation between the variables and theories 
(Hypotheses and predicted signs) 
 
The major theories and the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure and their expected relation (sign) are summarised in this table. The variables are 
defined in the text. Some variables are related to more than one group of hypotheses of debt maturity structure. 
 
 Tax savings Liquidation Risk and Signalling Agency/Contracting Cost Equity Market 
 
Tax  Bankruptcy Liquidity Signalling 
Under-
investment 
Asset 
Substitution 
Over-
investment Monitoring   
Lagged Maturity 
+ +        +   
Effective Tax rate 
+             
Interest Rate Volatility 
+  +           
Term Structure  
+             
Leverage 
  - +   -       
Liquidity 
   -     +      
Firm Quality 
    -         
Earnings Volatility 
- -            
Market-to-book ratio 
  - +   -  + -   
Firm size 
  +    + +      
Asset Maturity 
   +   +       
Share Price Performance 
            + 
Market Equity Premium 
            - 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics of firm specific variables 
 
Maturity is the ratio of debt that matures in more than one year to total debt. Leverage is the ratio of book value of 
total debt to book value of total assets. Tax rate is the ratio of total tax charge to total taxable income. Market-to-book 
is the ratio of book value of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity to book value of total 
assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total sales. Liquidity is the ratio of current assets to total assets. Asset maturity 
is the ratio of net property, plant &equipment to depreciation expense. Firm Quality is the ratio of net income plus 
depreciation to net debt. Earnings volatility is the first-difference of earnings minus average of the first-differences. 
Share price performance is the difference of log of annual share prices. 
 
Panel A: France 
 Mean Median Std.dev Variance Kurtosis Skew. Min. Max. N-Obs. 
Maturity 0.59 0.61 0.27 0.07 -0.60 -0.28 0.00 1.00 3160 
Leverage 0.23 0.22 0.14 0.02 0.63 0.65 0.00 1.00 3160 
Effective Tax rate 0.32 0.35 0.46 0.21 62.38 3.20 -3.97 6.78 3160 
Market-to-book ratio 1.57 1.23 1.31 1.71 155.52 9.23 0.48 33.36 3160 
Size 14.84 14.85 1.93 3.74 0.96 -0.25 0.00 20.23 3160 
Liquidity 0.60 0.62 0.19 0.04 -0.29 -0.43 0.01 0.98 3160 
Asset maturity 5.87 4.91 5.78 33.43 74.05 7.09 0.03 92.95 3160 
Firm Quality  0.24 0.37 17.85 318.60 183.34 -2.43 -327.72 282.80 3140 
Earnings volatility 0.76 0.20 5.85 34.26 2058.76 42.27 0.00 289.62 2889 
Share price performance 0.09 0.08 0.41 0.17 2.47 0.04 -2.35 2.37 2867 
 
 
Panel B: Germany 
 Mean Median Std.dev Variance Kurtosis Skew. Min. Max. N-Obs. 
Maturity 0.53 0.57 0.31 0.10 -1.10 -0.29 0.00 1.00 5882 
Leverage 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.04 0.42 0.98 0.00 1.00 6809 
Tax rate 0.39 0.45 1.03 1.06 110.21 -0.14 -16.47 16.64 6782 
Market-to-book ratio 2.01 1.32 3.83 14.65 243.03 13.50 0.25 93.56 6130 
Size 12.34 12.38 2.31 5.31 0.65 -0.25 1.23 19.40 6563 
Liquidity 0.55 0.58 0.23 0.05 -0.62 -0.38 0.00 1.00 6797 
Asset maturity 7.73 5.27 11.01 121.13 76.92 7.44 0.00 174.33 6329 
Firm Quality  -0.28 0.22 34.14 1165.49 138.43 4.50 -0.48 680.00 6710 
Earnings volatility 3.30 0.37 19.94 397.52 535.95 19.64 0.00 653.94 6153 
Share price performance 0.01 0.00 0.34 0.12 4.13 0.35 -2.23 2.78 5406 
 
Panel C: UK 
 Mean Median Std.dev Variance Kurtosis Skew. Min. Max. N-Obs. 
Maturity 0.46 0.47 0.34 0.11 -1.36 0.03 0.00 1.00 32339 
Leverage 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.02 2.80 1.22 0.00 1.00 35266 
Tax rate 0.36 0.36 0.55 0.31 470.55 -3.92 -18.50 18.43 35248 
Market-to-book ratio 1.47 1.11 1.96 3.83 727.15 21.07 0.12 94.76 34848 
Size 9.03 8.86 1.89 3.57 0.65 0.19 0.02 16.22 35111 
Liquidity 0.57 0.61 0.21 0.05 -0.34 -0.54 0.01 1.00 35244 
Asset maturity 13.58 9.34 17.80 316.93 66.75 6.75 0.00 282.63 35157 
Firm Quality  0.63 0.48 28.92 836.58 568.46 1.81 -983.00 961.00 35198 
Earnings volatility 1.12 0.25 8.04 64.71 2767.91 44.65 0.00 660.76 32835 
Share price performance 0.06 0.07 0.47 0.22 3.35 -0.34 -4.01 3.30 32854 
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Table 3 
Correlation matrix 
 
See table 2 for firm-specific variable definitions. Interest rate volatility is the standard deviation of the monthly government bond yield 
over the previous year, matched with the month of firm’s fiscal year-end. Equity premium is the difference between return on equity 
and return on treasury-bills, matched to the month of the firm's fiscal year-end, with a six-month lag. Term-structure is the difference 
between the month-end yields on long-term government bonds and three-months treasury-bills, matched to the month of the firm’s 
fiscal year-end, with a six-month lag.  ** and * show that the correlation is significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: France 
 
 
Variable Maturity Tax rate 
Earnings 
vol. 
Term-
struc 
Interest 
vol. Liquidity Leverage Quality 
Mkt-to-
book 
Firm 
Size 
Asset 
Mat. 
Equity 
prem. 
Tax rate -0.005                       
Earnings vol 0.022 -0.013                     
Term-struc. -0.061** -0.001 -0.017                   
Interest vol 0.028 0.005 -0.01 -0.407**                 
Liquidity -0.203** 0.020 0.011 -0.032 -0.001               
Leverage 0.147** -0.056** 0.007 -0.104** 0.044** -0.358**             
Quality 0.008 0.008 -0.003 -0.002 0.016 -0.016 0.027           
Mkt-to-book -0.072** 0.024 -0.013 0.130** -0.050** 0.072** -0.185** 0         
Firm Size 0.011 0.042* 0.003 -0.091** 0.046* -0.157** 0.095** 0.033 -0.201**       
Asset Mat. 0.130 -0.034 -0.007 -0.004 0.003 -0.394** 0.306** 0.006 -0.080** 0.056**     
Equity prem -0.010 -0.029 -0.01 0.122** -0.025 -0.039* 0.001 0.011 0.092** -0.055** -0.007   
Share-perf. -0.003 0.049* -0.025 0.068** -0.076** 0.051** -0.128** 0.003 0.218** 0.082** -0.057** -0.12** 
 
 
Panel B: Germany 
GERMANY  Maturity Tax rate 
Earnings 
vol. 
Term-
struc. 
Interest 
vol. Liquidity Leverage Quality 
Mkt-to-
book 
Firm 
Size 
Asset 
Mat. 
Equity 
prem. 
Tax rate 0.033**                       
Earnings vol. 0.009 -0.015                     
Term-struc. 0.006 -0.005 -0.019                   
Interest vol. -0.004 -0.025 0.009 0.079**                 
Liquidity -0.305** -0.038* -0.037* -0.013 -0.010               
Leverage 0.055** -0.030* 0.048** -0.006 0.015 -0.196**             
Quality -0.020 0.001 0.009 0.011 -0.017 -0.017 -0.002           
Mkt-to-book -0.049** -0.006 0.000 -0.025 -0.011 -0.030* -0.027 0.012         
Firm Size -0.028 0.023 -0.092** -0.038* -0.027 0.184** -0.185** -0.020 -0.214**       
Asset Mat. 0.109** -0.023 0.032* -0.048** -0.002 -0.258** 0.199** -0.012 -0.001 -0.169**     
Equity prem. 0.009 0.010 0.006 -0.262** -0.407** 0.004 -0.029 -0.001 -0.004 0.050** 0.008   
Share-perf. 0.066** 0.034* 0.012 -0.116** 0.026 -0.026 -0.117** 0.012 0.100** 0.028 0.010 -0.08** 
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Panel C: UK 
 
UK  Maturity Tax rate 
Earnings 
vol. 
Term-
struc. 
Interest 
vol. Liquidity Leverage Quality 
Mkt-to-
book 
Firm 
Size Asset Mat 
Equity 
prem. 
Tax rate 0.005                       
Earnings vol. -0.027** -0.026**                     
Term-struc. 0.044** 0.036** -0.013*                   
Interest vol. -0.044** 0.100** -0.017** 0.209**                 
Liquidity -0.297** 0.028** 0.000 -0.010 0.061**               
Leverage 0.143** -0.072** 0.039** -0.051** -0.053** -0.179**             
Quality 0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 0.006 -0.008           
Mkt-to-book 0.010 -0.057** 0.011 -0.028** -0.141** 0.049** -0.021** -0.02*         
Firm Size 0.281** 0.072** -0.068** 0.026** -0.024** -0.043** 0.080** 0.002 -0.089**       
Asset Mat. 0.131** -0.006 0.008 0.031** 0.032** -0.419** 0.098** -0.002 -0.082** -0.072**     
Equity prem 0.008 -0.016** -0.001 0.007 -0.094** -0.003 -0.013* 0.000 0.011 -0.001 -0.008   
Share-perf. 0.055** 0.033** -0.012* 0.127** -0.019** 0.017** -0.168** 0.000 0.117** 0.047** 0.022** 0.143** 
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Table 4 
 
Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure: 
GMM-DIF (first-differenced GMM) vs. WITHIN (fixed-effects) estimations 
 
See table 2 and 3 for variable definitions. The ‘Theory’ column represents the debt maturity theories as follows: D=maturity 
dynamics, T=taxes, LS= liquidity and signalling, C=contracting costs, and M=equity market. The dependent variable 
‘Maturity’ is the ratio of long-term debt (maturing in more than one year) to total debt. Standard Errors are in parentheses 
below the coefficients. Correlation 1 and 2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is the test of over identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Test-1 test the joint significance 
of estimated coefficients; asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of no relationship. (*), (**) and (***) indicates 
that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Maturityi,t  
Explanatory 
Variables 
Theory Predicted 
Sign 
FRANCE GERMANY UK 
WITHIN GMM-DIF WITHIN GMM-DIF WITHIN GMM-DIF 
Maturityi,t-1 D + 0.3702*** 0.3494*** 0.3642*** 0.4179*** 0.5270*** 0.5578*** 
   (0.0333) (0.0531) (0.0262) (0.0474) (0.0088) (0.0313) 
Effective tax ratei,t T -/+ 0.0021 0.0000 0.0023 0.0042 0.0007 0.0114 
   (0.0055) (0.0079) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0025) (0.0199) 
Earnings vol.i,t T - 0.0008 0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0015 
   (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0015) 
Term-structure T + -0.0020 -0.0163 0.0573** 0.0246 0.0346*** 0.0416*** 
   (0.0333) (0.0400) (0.0270) (0.0352) (0.0069) (0.0097) 
Interest vol. T + -0.0036 -0.0053 0.0210 0.0211 -0.0102** -0.0140*** 
   (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0212) (0.0289) (0.0044) (0.0065) 
Liquidityi,t LS -/+ -0.1673* 0.1017 -0.3612*** -0.2383 -0.1890*** -0.2749*** 
   (0.0961) (0.1338) (0.0693) (0.2010) (0.0277) (0.0865) 
Leveragei,t LS -/+ 0.0854 -0.0234 -0.1496** -0.3144** -0.1094*** -0.0966 
   (0.0717) (0.1017) (0.0602) (0.1394) (0.0278) (0.0828) 
Firm Qualityi.t LS - -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0001 0.0001** 0.0009 
   (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0006) 
Mkt-to-booki,t C -/+ -0.0026 -0.0054 -0.0033 0.0025 0.0011 -0.0014 
   (0.0087) (0.0151) (0.0022) (0.0124) (0.0020) (0.0064) 
Firm sizei,t C + 0.0112 0.0195 0.0131 0.0418 0.0398*** 0.0183 
   (0.0197) (0.0299) (0.0125) (0.0383) (0.0065) (0.0206) 
Asset maturityi,t C + 0.0023* 0.0036* 0.0008 0.0015 0.0008*** 0.0000 
   (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0007) 
Equity premium M -/+ 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0003 0.0019*** 
   (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Share-price perf. M + 0.0036 0.0132 0.0241** -0.0130 0.0193*** 0.0312*** 
   (0.0101) (0.0139) (0.0108) (0.0276) (0.0033) (0.0092) 
Correlation1   -1.739*** -5.763*** -3.747*** -8.854*** -5.659*** -16.39*** 
Correlation2   0.0794 1.514 -2.873*** 0.1074 0.6368 1.897 
Sargan Test (df)   - 243 (499) - 207 (185) - 326 (248) 
Wald Test-1 (df)   206(21)*** 74.92 (21)*** 311(21)*** 105 (21)*** 5148(21)*** 577 (21)*** 
R2   0.1742 - 0.1573 - 0.3196 - 
Firms    297 297 469 469 2093 2093 
Observations   2430 2133 3936 3467 26779 24703 
Estimation Period   1985-2000 1986-2000 1989-2000 1990-2000 1971-2000 1972-2000 
 
 29 
Table 5 
Corporate debt maturity structure (all countries pooled) 
(Short-run and long-run equilibrium using system-GMM estimations) 
 
See tables 2 and 3 for variable definitions. The ‘Theory’ column represents the debt maturity theories as follows: 
D=maturity dynamics, T=taxes, LS= liquidity and signalling, C=contracting costs, and M=equity market. The 
dependent variable ‘Maturity’ is the ratio of long-term debt (maturing in more than one year) to total debt. Leverage is 
book leverage and the size is measured by sales. Standard Errors are in parentheses below the coefficients. 
Correlation 1 and 2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is the test of over identifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Test-1 test the joint significance of 
estimated coefficients; asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of no relationship. (*), (**) and (***) indicates 
that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Fifteen 
industry dummies (see appendix B) are included in all models. Wald test-2 tests the joint significance of industry 
dummies. The 'specific' estimates are obtained following the general-to-specific approach, i.e. by excluding the 
insignificant lagged explanatory variables from the estimation of a general dynamic model. 
 
Dependent Variable:       Maturityi,t  
Explanatory 
Variables 
Theory Predicted 
Sign 
General Specific 
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
Maturityi,t-1 D + 0.6718*** - 0.6737*** - 
   (0.0257) - (0.0256) - 
Effective tax ratei,t T -/+ 0.0066 0.0183 0.0024 0.0075 
   (0.0170) (0.0650) (0.0184) (0.0564) 
Earnings voli,t T - -0.0004 -0.0017 0.0000 -0.0001 
   (0.0007) (0.0024) (0.0007) (0.0023) 
Term-structure T + 0.0267*** 0.0813*** 0.0285*** 0.0875*** 
   (0.0078) (0.0243) (0.0077) (0.0242) 
Interest vol. T + -0.0097** -0.0295** -0.0064* -0.0195* 
   (0.0041) (0.0127) (0.0040) (0.0122) 
Liquidityi,t LS -/+ -0.3207*** -0.5185*** -0.2763*** -0.5024*** 
   (0.1000) (0.0745) (0.1064) (0.0837) 
Leveragei,t LS -/+ -0.2063** 0.2724** -0.1820** 0.2792** 
   (0.0977) (0.1259) (0.0941) (0.1223) 
Firm Qualityi.t LS - 0.0003 0.0010 0.0005 0.0015 
   (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0014) 
Mkt-to-booki,t C -/+ 0.0051 0.0054 0.0014 0.0041 
   (0.0051) (0.0110) (0.0016) (0.0049) 
Firm Sizei,t C + -0.0144 0.0311*** 0.0197*** 0.0603*** 
   (0.0242) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0130) 
Asset maturityi,t C + -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0006 
   (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0019) 
Equity premium M -/+ 0.0007*** 0.0023*** 0.0008*** 0.0025*** 
   (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0009) 
Share-price perf. M + 0.0122*** 0.0372*** 0.0090** 0.0275** 
   (0.0044) (0.0132) (0.0037) (0.0110) 
Dummy Germany    -0.0112 -0.0340 0.0081 0.0248 
   (0.0086) (0.0264) (0.0121) (0.0371) 
Dummy UK   0.0275*** 0.0836*** 0.0821*** 0.2514*** 
   (0.0102) (0.0306) (0.0251) (0.0772) 
Constant   0.1121*** 0.3418*** -0.0405 -0.1240 
   (0.0315) (0.0961) (0.0710) (0.2180) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
   General Specific 
Correlation1   -20.28***  -20.56***  
Correlation2   3.312  3.341  
Sargan Test (df)   528 (512)  629 (512)  
Wald Test-1 (df)   5286(23)***  3717(17)***  
Wald Test-2 (df)   26.6 (15)**  18.95 (15)  
R2   0.5865  0.5828  
Firms    2859  3019  
Observations   33145  35246  
Estimation Period   1972-2000  1971-2000  
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Table 6 
Dynamic corporate debt maturity structure: System-GMM estimations 
 
See tables 2 and 3 for variable definitions. The ‘Theory’ column represents the debt maturity theories as follows: D=maturity 
dynamics, T=taxes, LS= liquidity and signalling, C=contracting costs, and M=equity market. The dependent variable ‘Maturity’ is 
the ratio of long-term debt (maturing in more than one year) to total debt. Leverage is book leverage and the size is measured 
by sales. Standard Errors are in parentheses below the coefficients. Correlation 1 and 2 are first and second order 
autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
Sargan Test is the test of over identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of instruments' validity. 
Wald Test-1 test the joint significance of estimated coefficients; asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of no 
relationship. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively.  Fifteen industry dummies (see appendix B) are included in all models. Wald test-2 tests the joint significance of 
industry dummies. The 'specific' estimates are obtained following the general-to-specific approach, i.e. by excluding the 
insignificant lagged explanatory variables from the estimation of a general dynamic model. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Maturityi,t  
Explanatory 
Variables 
Theory Predicted 
Sign 
FRANCE GERMANY UK 
General Specific General Specific General Specific 
Maturityi,t-1 D + 0.4484*** 0.4702*** 0.4873*** 0.4621*** 0.6623*** 0.6691*** 
   (0.0485) (0.0437) (0.0362) (0.0365) (0.0271) (0.0266) 
Effective Tax ratei,t T -/+ -0.0101 -0.0191 0.0075 0.0193* -0.0157 -0.0184 
   (0.0125) (0.0191) (0.0066) (0.0112) (0.0156) (0.0153) 
Earnings voli,t T - 0.0043 0.0031 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0007 
   (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
Term-structure T + -0.0616* -0.0527* 0.0535** 0.0672** 0.0280*** 0.0293*** 
   (0.0349) (0.0319) (0.0244) (0.0327) (0.0080) (0.0079) 
Interest vol. T + -0.0026 0.0032 0.0023 0.0234 -0.0144*** -0.0148*** 
   (0.0074) (0.0071) (0.0221) (0.0294) (0.0049) (0.0047) 
Liquidityi,t LS -/+ -0.1672 -0.0194 -0.2726* -0.1616* -0.2122** -0.1273*** 
   (0.1763) (0.0808) (0.1566) (0.0978) (0.0986) (0.0463) 
Leveragei,t LS -/+ -0.1052 -0.1390 0.0181 -0.1050* -0.2320** -0.2280** 
   (0.1014) (0.1087) (0.1467) (0.0626) (0.1010) (0.0995) 
Firm Qualityi.t LS - 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 
   (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Mkt-to-booki,t C -/+ -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0020 0.0042 0.0016 
   (0.0157) (0.0097) (0.0094) (0.0074) (0.0050) (0.0030) 
Firm Sizei,t C + 0.0385* 0.0315 -0.0068 0.0109 -0.0238 -0.0245 
   (0.0217) (0.0232) (0.0283) (0.0088) (0.0242) (0.0239) 
Asset maturityi,t C + 0.0019 0.0020 0.0012 0.0025** 0.0002 0.0001 
   (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
Equity premium M -/+ 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0007 0.0028* 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
   (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Share-price perf. M + 0.0105 0.0085 0.0242** 0.0273 0.0123*** 0.0107*** 
   (0.0109) (0.0100) (0.0125) (0.0223) (0.0047) (0.0044) 
Constant   0.3253*** 0.2525** 0.4335*** 0.2187* 0.1039*** 0.1001*** 
   (0.0970) (0.1043) (0.0708) (0.1344) (0.0281) (0.0371) 
Correlation1    -6.045*** -6.740*** -9.612*** -9.792*** -18.51*** -18.97*** 
Correlation2    1.0839 1.082 0.5337 0.4466 2.859 3.104 
Sargan Test (df)   252.1 (647) 273.3 (656) 297.9 (296) 316.5 (301) 601.5 (612) 593.5 (612) 
Wald Test-1 (df)   279.9 (21)*** 218.9 (15)*** 488.2 (21)*** 258.4 (13)*** 4848 (21)*** 3282(15)*** 
Wald Test-2 (df)   47.55 (15)*** 50.08 (15)*** 62.75 (14)*** 30.39 (14)*** 28.52 (15)** 33.6(15)*** 
R2   0.4948 0.4914 0.4940 0.4560 0.5894 0.5880 
Firms   297 328 469 482 2093 2211 
Observations   2430 2672 3936 4195 26779 28410 
Estimation Period   1986-2000 1985-2000 1990-2000 1989-2000 1972-2000 1971-2000 
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Table 7 
Static long-run relationship between debt maturity and firm- and market-specific factors 
 
The parameters are estimated using equation (5) based on the models in table 5. See tables 2 and 3 for variable definitions. 
The ‘Theory’ column represents the debt maturity theories as follows: D=maturity dynamics, T=taxes, LS= liquidity and 
signalling, C=contracting costs, and M=equity market. The dependent variable ‘Maturity’ is the ratio of long-term debt 
(maturing in more than one year) to total debt. Leverage is book leverage and the size is measured by sales. Standard 
Errors are in parentheses below the coefficients. Correlation 1 and 2 are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, 
respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is the test of 
over identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of instruments' validity. Wald Test-1 test the 
joint significance of estimated coefficients; asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of no relationship. (*), (**) and 
(***) indicates that coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  
Fifteen industry dummies (see appendix B) are included in all models. Wald test-2 tests the joint significance of industry 
dummies. The 'specific' estimates are obtained following the general-to-specific approach, i.e. by excluding the insignificant 
lagged explanatory variables from the estimation of a general dynamic model. 
 
Dependent Variable: MATURITYi,t 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Theory Predicted 
Sign 
FRANCE GERMANY UK 
General Specific General Specific General Specific 
Effective tax ratei,t T -/+ -0.0239 -0.0360 0.0159 0.0424** -0.0648 -0.0557 
   (0.0318) (0.0354) (0.0167) (0.0202) (0.0553) (0.0464) 
Earnings voli,t T - 0.0079* 0.0058 -0.0008 0.0008 -0.0065* -0.0022 
   (0.0048) (0.0063) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0040) (0.0039) 
Term-structure T + -0.1116* -0.0994* 0.1043** 0.1250** 0.0828*** 0.0886*** 
   (0.0631) (0.0610) (0.0477) (0.0610) (0.0243) (0.0244) 
Interest vol.  T + -0.0047 0.0061 0.0045 0.0436 -0.0427*** -0.0447*** 
   (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0430) (0.0546) (0.0148) (0.0146) 
Liquidityi,t LS -/+ -0.2045** -0.0367 -0.5059*** -0.3024* -0.4518*** -0.3847*** 
   (0.1022) (0.1529) (0.0877) (0.1791) (0.0767) (0.1357) 
Leveragei,t LS -/+ 0.2152* 0.1951* 0.0047 -0.1952* 0.2571* 0.2448* 
   (0.1241) (0.1045) (0.1040) (0.1159) (0.1447) (0.1466) 
Firm Qualityi.t LS - -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0013 0.0010 
   (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0015) 
Mkt-to-booki,t C -/+ 0.0059 0.0013 -0.0103 -0.0037 0.0096 0.0047 
   (0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0090) (0.0138) (0.0110) (0.0090) 
Firm sizei,t C + -0.0026 -0.0017 -0.0035 0.0203 0.0433*** 0.0420*** 
   (0.0080) (0.0074) (0.0064) (0.0163) (0.0049) (0.0051) 
Asset maturityi,t C + 0.0035** 0.0037 0.0014 0.0047* 0.0012 0.0002 
   (0.0016) (0.0034) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0018) 
Equity premium M -/+ 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0013 0.0052* 0.0023*** 0.0026*** 
   (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Share-price perf. M + 0.0191 0.0160 0.0472** 0.0507 0.0364*** 0.0323*** 
   (0.0197) (0.0188) (0.0242) (0.0408) (0.0137) (0.0131) 
Constant   0.5898*** 0.4767** 0.8455*** 0.4066* 0.3076*** 0.3025*** 
   (0.1695) (0.1988) (0.1243) (0.2470) (0.0833) (0.1114) 
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Appendix: A 
The structure of panel data 
 
The panel data are constructed as follows. All dead and alive firms whose data are available are included in the 
sample. The total number of non-financial firms stands at 1,235 for France, 1,590 for Germany, and 3,153 for the UK. 
The firms with any missing variable are excluded from the sample. The panel data set is unbalanced as there are more 
observations for some firms than for others. Sections in this appendix are as follows: a) Number of firms having 'n' 
continuous observations during the period; b) number of observations in each year; c) number of firms in each industry 
class; and d) number of observations in each industry class.  
 
 
a) Number of firms b) Number of observations c) Number of firms  
n (years) France Germany  UK Years France Germany  UK Industry France Germany   UK 
            
3 60 22 207 1969 - - 466 1 23 49 165 
4 54 26 218 1970 - - 479 2 10 44 31 
5 33 35 196 1971 - - 489 3 19 56 199 
6 13 26 128 1972 - - 866 4 31 37 162 
7 22 9 98 1973 - - 903 5 48 59 261 
8 17 9 67 1974 - - 930 6 16 35 28 
9 14 8 56 1975 - - 936 7 41 89 315 
10 12 8 52 1976 - - 940 8 22 16 87 
11 1 13 87 1977 - - 951 9 25 21 191 
12 47 24 91 1978 - - 962 10 1 0 55 
13 16 38 82 1979 - - 979 11 19 22 147 
14 5 364 89 1980 - - 1000 12 31 23 254 
15 3 - 85 1981 - - 1029 13 46 34 319 
16 3 - 65 1982 - - 1067 14 17 64 142 
17 5 - 73 1983 59 - 1122 15 9 33 67 
18 53 - 68 1984 64 - 1200  
19 - - 64 1985 67 - 1260 d) No. of observations 
20 - - 50 1986 70 - 1303 Industry France Germany   UK 
21 - - 34 1987 75 401 1314     
22 - - 21 1988 92 418 1325 1 253 575 2580 
23 - - 26 1989 142 437 1312 2 94 565 611 
24 - - 20 1990 142 446 1288 3 235 689 3600 
25 - - 26 1991 151 454 1247 4 268 462 2323 
26 - - 23 1992 163 456 1216 5 375 593 3248 
27 - - 44 1993 175 465 1222 6 153 437 476 
28 - - 44 1994 197 473 1269 7 397 1120 5395 
29 - - 165 1995 207 500 1318 8 186 199 1367 
30 - - 27 1996 242 535 1402 9 217 238 2311 
31 - - 39 1997 291 557 1483 10 4 0 585 
32 - - 178 1998 345 572 1471 11 143 269 2161 
    1999 344 563 1340 12 296 275 3954 
    2000 334 532 1177 13 348 225 3417 
        14 141 760 2694 
        15 50 402 544 
Total 358 582 2423 Total 3160 6809 35266     
 
